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Abstract 
Lack of action on cross-border environmental problems in developing countries is often 
ascribed to gaps in local capacity and resources, failure of regional cooperation, and lack of 
financial support from rich countries.  Using the case of the Southeast Asian Haze pollution 
from forest and peat fires in Indonesia, we explore the challenges posed by environmental 
problems whose causes are closely linked to local development and livelihood strategies, 
and whose impacts are local, regional (haze) as well as global (carbon emissions). We 
assess whether there are real opportunities to implement effectively the recent Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. To address 
the deep determinants behind haze pollution, we propose signatories to the Agreement 
refocus their efforts to controlling peat fires rather than strive for a zero-burning regime. We 
also recommend a new approach to financing sustainable development based on rules and 
incentives, with a regional pool of funds, contributed by rich countries through the Global 
Environment Facility and countries in Southeast Asia.  
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Introduction 
Regional agreements and organizations have a significant role to play in improved 
environmental governance (Koh & Robinson 2002; United Nations Development Programme 
et al. 2003). We consider the challenges posed to the environmental effectiveness of 
regional agreements and organizations with the case of haze pollution in Southeast Asia. 
This pollution originates from fires (mainly in Indonesia) and is closely linked to local 
development and livelihood strategies. Despite the local causes of haze pollution, its 
transboundary effects and importance suggest that it requires regional initiatives supported 
by global financing for its mitigation. Countries in the region are affected through health 
impacts on their populations, and disruptions of economic activity. Global impacts are mainly 
through carbon emissions, and addressing the problem could have sizeable global benefits 
in mitigating climate change. It had been estimated that the 1997/98 fires in Indonesia had 
generated up to 30% of the annual global average greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 
land use change over the period 1989-1995 (Page et al. 2002; Tacconi 2003). An information 
paper released at the meeting of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change in November 2006 estimated total emissions from peatland in 1997 and 2002 at 
about 40% of total global CO2 emissions, including those from fossil fuel combustion (Silvius 
et al. 2006).
1  
Past diplomatic efforts have so far failed to address the haze problem in Southeast Asia, as 
demonstrated by the fact that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
2 
Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Air Pollution of 1995 and the ASEAN Regional Haze 
Action Plan of 1997
3 have not reduced the regular occurrence of the problem, with haze 
pollution in September and October 2006 probably being the worst since 1997/98.
4 The more 
recent diplomatic effort at addressing haze pollution is the Agreement on Transboundary 
Haze Pollution (hereafter referred to as the Agreement) signed in 2002 by members of the 
ASEAN, which entered into force on 25 November 2003. Indonesia had not ratified the 
Agreement at the time of the 2006 haze event, a fact that shows the lack of political   4
commitment in Indonesia to address the problem. We argue that there are problems with 
the Agreement approach that, if not addressed, will certainly reduce its effectiveness.  
In discussing the effectiveness of regional environmental organizations and regimes it is 
important to clarify first its meaning in this context. A negotiation process may be said to be 
effective if it leads to the establishment of an environmental agreement. An international 
organization with the mandate to support the implementation of the regime may be said to be 
effective if it contributes to the achievement of the goals of the agreement. Unfortunately,  
this need not necessarily result in significant improvements in environmental management if 
the agreement is not well designed (Kutting 2000). Incorrect specification of the 
environmental problem could lead to agreements and institutions that appear to be 
environmentally effective, yet do not address the most relevant problems. We will exemplify 
this issue in the case of the fires and haze in South East Asia by showing that the impacts of 
haze do not necessarily imply preventing all land and forest fires (as specified in the ASEAN 
Agreement), but the Agreement should  certainly be focused on preventing peat fires.  
The focus of this paper on peat fires differs from that of other studies that have dealt with the 
haze pollution problem. Recent papers have instead focused on the need to improve forest 
management broadly defined, that is forest on peat and mineral soils alike (Barber and 
Schweithelm 2000; Tan 2005; Mayer 2006). The emphasis of the paper on peat fires does 
not imply that concerns about overall forest management in Indonesia are not justified. 
Deforestation and forest degradation have implications for climate change and for 
biodiversity conservation. Our argument is that peat fires are the main source of pollution 
relevant to the Agreement, which should therefore focus on them as a matter of priority. 
Separate initiatives, such as the ongoing East Asia Forest Law Enforcement and 
Governance process,
5 are required to address broad forest management issues. 
To deliver positive environmental outcomes, environmental regimes and organizations also 
need to put in place effective incentives and adopt appropriate tools to address the 
environmental problem of interest. We argue that financial incentives need to be used to   5
address the haze problem and that regional and global environmental benefits peat fires 
mitigation need to be reflected in the design of mechanisms to address their local causes. 
We begin with an overview of the ASEAN approach to multilateral environmental problems, 
describe the deep determinants of the problem, and discuss what might be done to improve 
environmental outcomes in the region in terms of haze pollution. We then explore how global 
financing and incentive mechanisms might be used to alleviate these causes in the context of 
regional cross-border collaboration. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for 
addressing the fire and haze problem in Southeast Asia, and lessons for the effectiveness of 
regional and global responses to transboundary environmental problems in developing 
countries more generally. 
ASEAN environmental management and the Transboundary Haze Agreement 
The structure of ASEAN and its approach to environmental management have been 
comprehensively described by Koh and Robinson (2002). The ‘ASEAN Way’ of regional 
cooperation involves three fundamental standards: i) non-interference in national government 
policies, ii) consensus building and cooperative programs are preferred over legally binding 
treaties, iii) implementation of programs is carried out at the national level instead of creating 
a regional bureaucracy. The third standard has lead to the establishment of a small ASEAN 
Secretariat based in Jakarta with the mandate to facilitate cooperation.  
ASEAN has been active in biodiversity conservation and the control of haze pollution from 
land and forest fires. In these areas, the ASEAN Way has led to cooperation focused on 
activities such as networking, national institution building, data and information management, 
coordination of research activities, and education and training (Koh & Robinson 2002). 
ASEAN has helped shape a common regional environmental policy framework, contributed 
to stable relations among its members, and a consensus building process that has created a 
sound foundation for implementation. Koh and Robinson (2002) note that ASEAN also faces 
several limitations to its effectiveness, including the principle of non-intervention which could 
undermine the adoption of practical measures aimed at addressing regional problems; lack 
of expertise, data, funding and internal organizational support; lack of monitoring and   6
surveillance mechanisms that hamper ASEAN’s ability to gather information on 
environmental issues and to address them effectively; and the absence of an effective 
dispute settlement mechanism, as a result of ASEAN’s emphasis on decision-making 
through consensus building. 
In relation to haze pollution, these weaknesses are of concern because despite years of 
discussions at the regional level, a consensus-based approach has not mitigated the 
problem. In fact, a significant haze event occurred as recently as September-October 2006 
—  three years after the Agreement entered into force.  
The 2002 Agreement seeks to “…prevent and monitor transboundary haze pollution as a 
result of land and/or forest fires… through concerted national efforts and intensified regional 
and international co-operation…and pursued in the overall context of sustainable 
development...” (ASEAN, 2002, p. 4). Thus the Agreement explicitly recognizes the primacy 
of national states and their need to balance mitigation with other needs, but also seeks to 
promote greater international co-operation. The general obligations of the parties to the 
Agreement are to co-operate in developing and implementing measures to prevent and 
monitor haze pollution, respond to request from other parties for information and consultation 
on the transboundary nature of the problem, and for national governments to take legislative, 
administrative, and other relevant measures, to implement the Agreement (Article 4).  
The detailed obligations of the Agreement include the development and implementation of 
legislative and other regulatory measures, programs and strategies to promote a zero-
burning policy (Article 9.a), and ensuring that legislative, administrative and/or other relevant 
measures are taken to control open burning (defined as any fire, combustion or smoldering 
that occurs in open air) and to prevent land clearing using fire (Article 9.g). 
The Agreement also has provisions for the establishment of the ASEAN Transboundary 
Haze Pollution Fund designed to support the implementation of the Agreement (Article 20). 
The Parties to the Agreement are expected to make voluntary contributions to the Fund in 
accordance with the decisions of the Conference of the Parties and, where necessary, to   7
mobilize additional resources from relevant international organizations. The fund was 
established in November 2006, but with initial funding of a mere $100,000.
6  
Florano (2003) assesses the ‘theoretical strengths’ of the Agreement and compares them 
with those of other international environmental agreements on the basis of the strength index 
developed by Chasek (2001). The Agreement is ranked eighth out of thirteen considered.
7 
The Agreement is ranked in the bottom half because it does not have provisions for 
monitoring, compliance, and inspections. The latter problem is also noted by Tan (2005) who 
suggests that the inclusion of stronger compliance mechanisms would have foreclosed 
Indonesia’s ratification of the Agreement. It is worth noting that among the environmental 
agreements considered by Florano (2003) there are eight other agreements that do not have 
monitoring provisions, six that do not have compliance provisions, and ten that do not have 
inspection provisions. Therefore, the Agreement lack of monitoring and compliance 
mechanisms is not necessarily determined by the ‘ASEAN Way’. Rather, it is more likely due 
to the fact that Indonesia would not ratify the Agreement, as noted above, because it would 
have to shoulder most of the costs arising from its implementation. This is a key issue 
discussed at length later. It is worth anticipating, however, that to provide a significant 
contribution to the effectiveness of the Agreement, the Fund will need to address the 
capacity and incentives to prevent haze pollution faced by Indonesia.  
The adoption of zero-burning to address the haze problem is another problematic issue for 
the Agreement. This approach implicitly assumes that any fire is undesirable from the 
perspective of haze pollution reduction. We argue that this view is incorrect and that 
preventing and managing the fires that cause most of the haze pollution should be the 
central aspect of haze pollution management. In the following section we outline in more 
detail the nature of the fire and haze problems and document the contribution of peat fires to 
haze pollution. The adoption of a zero-pollution policy raises two concerns: i) impacts on 
slash and burn farmers, and ii) lack of prioritization of activities and funding aimed at 
reducing haze pollution.    8
The view that slash and burn farmers are responsible for most of the fires in Indonesia, and 
hence most of the haze pollution, has led to suggestions that the use of fire by farmers 
should be banned and alternative methods such as mechanical clearing should be promoted 
and subsidized (Varma 2004). These claims have been rebutted on the basis that forest fires 
are not the main source of haze pollution and that there is no solid evidence that slash and 
burn agriculture is the main cause of catastrophic fires such as those that affected East 
Kalimantan
8 in 1997/98 (Tacconi and Vayda 2006). In recognition of the problems faced by 
shifting cultivators and smallholders in adopting a zero-burning approach, the Agreement 
recognizes the need to develop appropriate techniques for controlled burning and to facilitate 
the exchange of experiences. This is certainly a useful provision but it does not go far 
enough in acknowledging that there need to be a more informed and nuanced approach to 
the management of fires. 
Malaysia allows small-scale farmers to burn for shifting cultivation on non-peat soils, for 
burning sugarcane and rice bagasse during low-hazard periods, while banning large-scale 
burning on plantation land and on all peat soils (Mayer 2006). However, this is not the 
approach adopted by Indonesia which has a blanket ban on burning. If implemented, the ban 
would negatively affect small-scale farmers (Tacconi and Ruchiat 2006). Tan (2005, p. 682) 
remarks that the Indonesian Government Regulation on fires (PP 4/2001) is ‘too general in 
its proscription of burning activities. For one thing, the Regulation does not discriminate 
between the different contexts within which fires can be started, e.g., in peat-rich lands, 
during El Niño occurrence or otherwise, for clearing plantations or for shifting agriculture. 
Without differentiated provisions to deal with the varied situations in which fires can be used, 
the Regulation’s blanket ban on fires is wholly unrealistic and doomed to fail.’ Tan (2005) 
goes on to support the revision of the fire regulatory framework proposed by Tacconi (2003), 
which involves a focus on managing fires (e.g. banning them in high fire risk periods, ban on 
fires in peatland) rather than banning all fires. 
A zero-burning approach also distracts from the main sources of haze pollution. For instance, 
current monitoring of fires during haze pollution events does not clearly differentiate between   9
fires that may be in agricultural and forest areas, thus causing limited haze pollution, and 
those fires that occur on peatland and that may burn for weeks or even months. A further and 
probably more significant problem is that a zero-burning approach implies that funding 
should be allocated to the prevention and mitigation of all fires. However, most of the funding 
should actually be allocated to the most polluting fires, that is peat fires. 
To summarize, we argue that the problem with the Agreement is not simply in terms of the 
process of cooperation it puts in place. The key shortcomings are its objectives, that is the 
focus on zero-burning, and a lack of attention to the economic incentives Indonesia faces to 
prevent haze pollution. 
The nature and deep determinants of fires and haze pollution
9 
The ASEAN focus on zero-burning regards all fires as undesirable and to be prevented and 
suppressed. This view of fires is also common in much of the literature that has dealt with fire 
management in Indonesia. Various policy recommendations have been proposed including: 
restricting or freezing forest conversion until improved land allocation policies and fire control 
procedures are in place, the adoption of reduced impact logging, strengthening rules and 
penalties against fire use for land clearing in plantations, and land use rationalization with 
community participation to promote consensus on land use and establish community 
responsibility and commitment (Applegate et al. 2001; BAPPENAS-ADB 1999; Barber & 
Schweithelm 2000; Glover 2001; Koh & Robinson 2002; Qadri 2001; Siegert et al. 2001).. 
However, it is misleading to think about fires as the policy problem, and indeed as a single 
problem, and to provide generalized recommendations to address it. The impacts of fires are 
the actual problem and a failure to recognize this point poses two significant risks: 
a)  all fires might be perceived as problematic rather than considering in what circumstances 
fire may be an appropriate land management tool; 
b)  fires may, and often do, have differentiated impacts (e.g., according to the location and 
impacted areas) that need to be addressed with different policies. 
Although there has been considerable discussion in Indonesia about the extent of the fires, it 
has not been clarified which fires are considered problematic, in the sense that they have   10
undesirable impacts and at what geographical scale those impacts are undesirable. In the 
case of Indonesian fires, the main fire-related policy problems are:  
1) haze pollution, which affects Indonesia and its neighbors – these regional issues are the 
focus of the Agreement;  
2) carbon emissions, which have global impacts, but are not the focus of the Agreement;  
3) forest degradation and deforestation, and loss of products and services (including timber, 
non-timber forest products, soil erosion, biodiversity) – these issues are of concern to the 
Indonesian nation and local communities; additionally, loss of biological diversity is a global 
concern;  
4) rural sector losses from escaped fires and fire induced weather anomalies –  this problem 
concerns the Indonesian nation and local communities.  
The first and second problems are most relevant to the Agreement. Haze pollution occurs 
every year during the dry periods in February-March and August-October and it has been 
recognized as a major problem over the last two decades. The most significant events took 
place during drought periods associated with El Niño years, the most important one in 
1997/98. Significant transboundary haze pollution also occurred in 2002, 2005 and 2006. In 
Indonesia, peat land fires are by far the largest contributor to haze pollution. In 1997/98, peat 
land fires may have contributed between 60% and 90% of the emissions that caused haze 
pollution, and they were also the major source of carbon emissions (BAPPENAS-ADB 1999).  
In 1997, the main contributors to the haze pollution that affected Singapore, mainland 
Malaysia, and Sumatra (Indonesia) were fires in the peat lands of Jambi, Riau,
10 and South 
Sumatra provinces, mainly due to land clearing for oil palm and timber plantations and, in the 
South Sumatran wetlands also due, to a yet unclear degree, to livelihood activities such as 
rice cultivation, fishing, grazing and logging (Anderson & Bowen 2000; Barber & Schweithelm 
2000, Map 2; Tapper et al. 2001; Chokkalingam et al. in press). In non El Niño years, land 
clearing for oil palm and timber plantations on peat lands appears to be the main source of 
haze (Sargeant 2001).    11
It needs to be stressed, however, that oil palm development is an increasingly popular 
activity among smallholders in Indonesia, which account for up to 50% of oil palm plantations 
(Barlow et al. 2003). While the role of large companies has been clearly documented, the 
extent to which the increasing significance of smallholder activities contributes to haze 
pollution is only starting to be contemplated. It is worth noting that many small-holders are 
closely linked to the larger plantation companies who contract them to grow oil palm. The 
extent to which smallholders can choose and can afford non-burning methods (independently 
of plantation companies) need to be researched. 
In 1997, peat land fires in the area of the Suharto-government initiated One Million Hectare 
Rice Project
11 in Central Kalimantan appear to have been the main source of haze pollution 
in Kalimantan (Barber and Schweithelm 2000; Page et al. 2002) also affecting Sarawak 
(Malaysia). Again in 2002 and 2006 fires in the same area contributed significantly to the 
haze pollution that engulfed Central and West Kalimantan and the Sarawak during the dry 
periods of August to November. Fires with much smoke had also affected the same area in 
August 2001 (Anderson 2001).  
In West Kalimantan in 1997, extensive burning probably for land clearing in oil palm and 
timber plantations (Potter & Lee 1999) in peat areas, and from livelihood activities in the 
peatland of the Danau Sentarum protected area  (Dennis et al. 2000) contributed to haze 
pollution in West Kalimantan and Sarawak.  
In January-April 1998, fires in the peat lands of the Central Mahakam Lakes area, which 
seems to be linked to a large degree to livelihood activities such as hunting and fishing 
(Chokkalingam et al. 2005), as well as large scale fires in other parts of East Kalimantan 
contributed to haze pollution in the province. These fires did not result in significant 
transboundary pollution.  
Fires in Southern West Papua, contributed large amounts of haze and carbon emissions in 
1997. This was not noticed much as the haze spread westwards at sea (Legg & Laumonier 
1999; Tapper et al. 2001) and the affected area in West Papua itself has low population   12
density and no major city. However, these fires do not contribute to transboudary haze 
pollution relevant to the Agreement. 
The above description of the distribution of the fires and haze pollution mainly refers to 
1997/98. This is due to the fact that most studies available have documented those fires, 
partly because they were the most significant ever experienced in the region. We have 
indicated, however, that similar haze pollution patterns have occurred in more recent and 
relatively dry years, that is, 2002, 2005 and 2006. The fires and related haze pollution of 
1997/98 could be considered an unusual occurrence because 1998 was the hottest year of 
the last millennium (Pittock 2005).
12 The now evident increase in temperatures associated 
with climate change – which have resulted in several recent years being the hottest on 
record after 1998 (Pittock 2005) – implies however that fires and haze pollution can be 
expected to occur regularly and probably more frequently than in the past (Running 2006). 
 
Deep determinants, costs and benefits 
The costs of fires and related haze and carbon emissions have been estimated as follows by 
Tacconi (2003). Indonesia may have lost between $1.7 and $2.7 billion as a result of 
negative impacts of fires on timber production, non-timber forest products, plantation crops, 
flood protection, erosion and siltation, and biodiversity, with most of these costs arising from 
fires outside peatland. The indirect impacts of haze pollution on primary and secondary 
sectors (which mainly occur as a result of peat fires) are estimated at $0.3-0.4 billion in 
Indonesia, and another $0.4 billion in Malaysia and Singapore. The global cost of 
greenhouse gas emissions, which may have been at least 400 million tons of carbon,
13 may 
be as large again and greater than the total cost in the region. For example, Tacconi (2003) 
assumed damage costs of 7$/tC, putting the cost from carbon emissions at $2.8 billion; and if 
current carbon prices under the EU emissions trading system (discussed below)  were used 
for this evaluation, the cost would be much higher still. 
There are also significant economic benefits associated with the fires, at least for Indonesia. 
Let us first consider the case of the 1997/98 fires in East Kalimantan, because they were the   13
largest forest fires in Indonesia, thus being relevant to the arguments focusing on the need 
to improve overall forest management and relate to the costs of fires outside peat areas 
noted above. If preventing the fires in East Kalimantan implied maintaining the forest in its 
‘pristine’ state, this would have required forgoing decades of log production.
14 This 
assumption may seem to be extreme. It could be argued that sustainable forest management 
would allow logging while minimizing the risk of fires. However, this assumption reflects the 
forest management conditions prevalent during the period considered below and arguably 
they still apply: sustainable forest management, which would reduce (but not eliminate) the 
risk of fire, is not implemented in Indonesia, as is the case in many other tropical forest 
countries (see ITTO 2006). Furthermore, once a forest has been opened up by (sustainable 
or unsustainable) logging, a range of activities take in place in the forest resulting in fires 
during periods of drought (e.g. Chokkalingam et al. 2005). Controlling or stopping these 
activities, which are often carried out by local rural people, is particularly difficult because of 
the large areas to be policed and it is also politically difficult. 
Official log production in East Kalimantan over the period 1969-97 was about 172.7 million 
cubic metres (Hinrichs and Solichin 1999). The net present value of those logs in 1997 was 
roughly US$ 25.4 billion. To err on the conservative side, it may be assumed that the value of 
the timber produced in the area burnt is equivalent to one quarter (i.e. about US$ 6.3 billion) 
of the total production, which is the ratio of the area burnt to total forest in logging 
concessions. Meanwhile, the costs of the fires in East Kalimantan have been estimated at a 
maximum of about US$ 1.7 billion (Tacconi 2003). Therefore, comparing the net present 
value of log production with the costs of fires indicates that it may not be desirable from an 
Indonesian national economic perspective to maintain ‘pristine’ forests in order to avoid the 
costs of fires. This conclusion holds even if a share of the haze related costs is attributed to 
the fires in East Kalimantan because the benefits of log harvesting are significantly larger 
than the cost of fires and the total costs associated with haze pollution. 
Let us now focus on the economics of peatland conversion, which is the most relevant 
aspect in relation to the focus of this paper. Financial interests drive peatland fires for land   14
clearing in plantations of oil palm and timber. In Indonesia, forest clearing to establish 
timber plantations on peat soil is estimated to cost $US 180/ha with burning, whereas zero-
burning methods (ie mechanical clearing) may cost as much as around $US 800/ha (Gouyon 
and Simorangkir 2002). Plantation companies have therefore a clear incentive to continue 
using fire to clear land. There is therefore a clear need for further research considering 
whether the private benefits derived by companies from burning do or do not exceed the 
social costs faced by Indonesian society as well as neighboring countries from haze pollution 
and global society from carbon emissions. On the basis of the limited information available 
we would expect that the global costs arising from burning on peatland are higher than the 
private benefits. Silvius et al. (2006) indicate that the oxidation of peat results in the release 
of 65 tonnes of CO2/ha/yr and fires would obviously generate much higher emissions. The 
global costs of that amount of carbon emissions are about $455/ha/yr, if we adopted the 
same price of carbon ($7/tonne) used for the estimation of the cost of fires in 1997/98 by 
Tacconi (2003). However, that carbon price has already been widely exceeded in actual 
trading as noted below and global costs can be expected to be significantly higher than the 
private benefits. There would appear to be a case, therefore, for global and regional society 
to subsidize mechanical land clearing by large-scale plantations. This is an issue that is 
addressed in detail in the following section. 
The above discussion puts significant emphasis on the role of plantations in generating 
emissions. We certainly do not intend to minimize their role, but we also think that only 
emphasizing their contribution is counterproductive. We have already noted that much of the 
pollution is generated by fires in degraded peatland, at least in the driest years when these 
emissions also reach their peak. We have also noted that the activities of rural people are 
thought to play a significant role in those fires. These points indicate that particular attention 
should be given to the economic and social aspects of regenerating degraded peatland. This 
may or may not involve addressing pollution from plantations. The focus of those activities 
will depend on who are the stakeholders actually using those lands. In this respect we wish 
to point out that there is still lack of sufficient knowledge about the direct causes of fires in   15
degraded peatland which mirrors that pointed out in relation to production forests on 
mineral soils (Vayda 2006).
15 
Various measures have been identified that could help reduce the likelihood, spread and 
severity of future peat fires (see Applegate et al. 2001, Tacconi 2003, Dennis et al. 2005). 
These include upgrading of drought and fire information systems to reduce the incidence of 
burning in dangerous weather conditions; institutional strengthening and development of 
local administrations' and plantation companies' capacity for fire management; incentive 
payments to regional governments to implement and enforce zoning provisions and other 
land use regulations; and buying off formal or informal property rights from plantation 
companies. Many of these measures would require substantial financial resources in order to 
be implemented at a large enough scale to make future peat fires appreciably less frequent 
and severe. Local and regional administrations in Indonesia are generally unable or unwilling 
to allocate large resources to the peat fire issue. This is because a substantial proportion of 
the damages occur elsewhere, and the current practices bring significant local development 
benefits. There is also a limited coordinated approach to land and fire management between 
Indonesian government agencies, and coordination has further suffered through recent 
devolvement of responsibility for natural resource management to the district level 
implemented under administrative reforms for greater regional autonomy (Resosudarmo 
2004). The central government in Indonesia has not taken significant steps to address the 
peat fires, other than a largely ineffectual (and in part misconceived) legislative ban on using 
fire for land clearing. Financial resources at the central government level are very limited, 
and there is a reluctance to spend money on natural resource management in the provinces 
to fulfill their resource management responsibilities. 
To summarize, the reasons and incentives people have to start the fires constitute the deep 
determinants of the problem. Only by effectively addressing these determinants can the 
causes, and ultimately the problems, be resolved. The fundamental issue is that at the local 
level there exist very few resources to address the challenges of haze pollution. Thus 
progress on haze pollution (and associated carbon emissions) requires financial and human   16
resources to regenerate degraded peatland, support the adoption of mechanical clearing 
in large-scale plantations on peatland, effectively monitor and enforce appropriate 
regulations, and provide assistance to improve fire management where fire may be a useful 
land management tool. Given that such financial resources and capacity are not provided by 
ASEAN to the party that generates almost all of the haze pollution, Indonesia, it is not 
surprising that there has been little progress on mitigating the problem. 
 
International financing for regional cooperation and local action 
Given the magnitude of carbon emissions from peat fires, the global community should 
consider supporting the implementation of the ASEAN Agreement by contributing to the 
Haze Fund, or through other institutional structures. Any country concerned about the long-
term impacts of climate change would have a potential interest to contribute to mitigating the 
peat fires because of the large carbon emissions from those fires. Given current attitudes 
evident in the global climate change negotiations, the greatest willingness to pay could be 
expected on the part of the European Union and Japan. There are also indications that the 
United States and some large developing countries are willing to put significant resources 
towards long-term greenhouse gas mitigation strategies.  
Under the European Emissions Trading Scheme, emissions offset credits from projects in 
developing countries under the Kyoto Protocol are being traded at prices in the order of 40 
$/tC (late 2006), and longer-term technological options for greenhouse gas reductions in 
energy systems (such as carbon capture and storage are likely to be even more expensive 
(Metz et al. 2005; Point Carbon 2006). Large reductions in future emissions from peat fires 
might be achieved at a cost that is only a small fraction of such amounts, if effective 
mechanisms were used to provide incentives locally. Peat fire prevention might thus be a 
very cost-effective strategy as part of broader efforts to reduce global greenhouse gas 
emissions.    17
Addressing the peat fire issue effectively will require coordination of the global, regional 
and local level. Action needs to take place at the level of local and provincial governments in 
Indonesia with some coordination by central government agencies. Countries in the region 
are in the best position to negotiate and steer implementation; and the most likely source for 
large-scale funding is at the global level. 
Financing sustainable development with global environmental benefits under current 
institutional settings is the job of the Global Environment Facility (GEF). But the GEF in its 
current form is too narrow and arguably too inflexible to do the job at hand. Finance is only 
for specific project activities, only for global benefits (carbon emissions but not air pollution), 
lead-times for projects are long, and projects are funded in response to local requests rather 
than for cross-border initiatives.  A better recipe to make funds flow and to catalyze regional 
action is to provide funding from rich countries but leave it up to regional coalitions of 
governments and other groups to design and implement programs.  Such financing would be 
complementary and entirely consistent with the Agreement. 
Given the benefits Indonesia receives from using fire as a land clearing tool and in 
developing peatland, it needs to be provided with incentives to do something about haze 
pollution. We thus propose the creation of a pool of funds contributed to by rich countries as 
well as ASEAN countries,
16 to address the causes behind haze pollution through local action 
in Indonesia. Contributions could come out of an overarching global mechanism for financing 
sustainable development.  
Such a mechanism (called CURES, Country Undertakings and Rights for Environmental 
Sustainability) was proposed by Grafton et al. (2004), and can also be seen as a blueprint for 
reform of the GEF. CURES would be rules-based, with contributions by rich countries 
differentiated, for example, on the basis of income per capita and environmental 
performance; and disbursements to middle- and low-income countries on the basis of need 
for funding and opportunity for action. This would provide greater certainty about funding 
than the current GEF arrangements. Entitlements to CURES funding would be transferable 
between recipient countries, providing greater flexibility for recipient countries in allocating   18
funds – under the GEF transferring funds to a regional fund such as that under the 
Agreement would not be allowed.  
Funding under CURES would be outcome-based. Recipient countries would need to meet to 
need agreed conditions, including a clear objective of what is to be achieved, and a plan of 
how funds will be spent. To ensure accountability, funds would only be disbursed if they are 
spent on verifiable activities with measurable benefits. If benchmarks were not met, 
additional technical assistance would be provided, and continued failure would lead to 
freezing of funds.  
For peat fire mitigation, CURES could be used in a common effort by ASEAN nations that 
suffer from the haze, and provide large amounts of funding fast and flexibly. Indonesia would 
use some of its CURES allocation as the principal program funding, and ASEAN countries 
affected by the haze would channel some of their CURES allocations to programs in 
Indonesia.  They would get payoffs in the form of reduced air pollution.  Depending on 
negotiations between these countries, the neighbors’ CURES allocations could either be 
given to Indonesia, or loaned, for Indonesia to pay back allocations for use in other ASEAN 
countries in the future. 
ASEAN countries, through the ASEAN Secretariat, could have a strong role in planning 
programs, in collaboration with the Indonesian government.  The regional neighbors are the 
best principals as they have a direct self interest in making the program work. As such, they 
would also act in line with the interests of rich donor countries who want to see reductions in 
carbon emissions, but without direct involvement in regional affairs. Disbursements would be 
to activities for peat fire prevention, such as those discussed earlier in the paper, with 
expenditures prioritized for programs that show the greatest promise of practical outcomes, 
with the rehabilitation of degraded peatland being a prime candidate . Performance would 
need to be reviewed at regular intervals, with funding to underperforming projects and 
activities cut or discontinued, and increased for successful ones.  
In designing the programs, it would be crucial to provide incentives for local actors to help 
implement them. Local and regional governments as well as relevant businesses and other   19
stakeholders need to be supported financially in the implementation of projects and 
activities that reduce peat fires and haze pollution. Thus, if projects reduce local people’s 
access to peatland and other resources, there need to be ample funds available for 
supporting alternative livelihoods (see Noor et al. 2005). Similarly, plantation companies 
clearing shallow peatland may need to be subsidized if they experience higher land clearing 
costs. Thus monetary incentives would be used together with law enforcement mechanisms 
to help achieve environmental policy objectives. It could be argued that plantation companies 
should be taxed if they pollute, rather than being subsidized. However, this approach faces a 
political constraint. The costs would be born by Indonesia and the benefits would accrue 
mostly to neighboring countries. It should be noted that the approach we propose is similar to 
the case of renewable energy sources. They are subsidized to support their adoption rather 
than relying only on taxation of non-renewable energy sources.  
Conclusions 
Haze pollution in Southeast Asia is a major and on-going regional and global socio-economic 
and environmental problem. The proximate cause is peat fires primarily in Indonesia. 
Recognition of the problems led the ten members of ASEAN to sign an agreement in 2002 to 
co-operate to mitigate them. However, the Agreement has yet to achieve its environmental 
goals in terms of controlling haze pollution. To effectively address the haze problem, ASEAN 
countries need to bring into sharper focus the nature of the problem they are seeking to 
resolve. They should focus on preventing peat fires rather than trying to prevent all fires. It 
should also be recognized that a zero-burning approach to fire management is not the most 
reasonable approach, given existing practices for land management and pressures for 
development. Many fires are useful and do not necessarily contribute to haze pollution. 
Controlled burning should be promoted for fires that have the potential to contribute to haze 
pollution. Zero-burning should be promoted only for those activities that pose a significant 
risk of haze pollution, such as those in relatively deep peat.
17  
Despite the best of intentions, the Agreement has done little to address the deep 
determinants of haze pollution and related environmental problems. We argue that, by itself,   20
the Agreement does not provide the appropriate incentives for Indonesia to act. Large 
benefits would accrue to neighboring countries by way of reduced health impacts and 
economic disruption, and globally through reducing the great amounts of carbon emissions 
from peat fires; but these transboundary effects are not translated into incentives to reduce 
the incidence and severity of peat fires in Indonesia.  
To address the incentives issue we propose to provide global financing funded by rich 
countries, and also ASEAN countries most affected by haze pollution (e.g. Quah 2002). If 
appropriately financed, designed and managed, such a fund offers a possibility of changing 
the deep determinants of the fires and mitigate their substantial environmental and economic 
impacts. An important requirement will be to allow for greater flexibility in how funds are used 
than under the GEF, including transfer and pooling of funds between developing countries. 
The implementation of on-the-ground activities supported by global funding faces significant 
challenges. At the local level, the actions of large commercial companies are technically 
easier to regulate, monitor, and provide incentives to than the activities of the thousands of 
rural people who depend on fire use in peat lands for their basic livelihood. Providing 
incentives and options for alternative livelihood strategies typically incurs large transaction 
costs. At the regional level, the ASEAN approach of non-intervention and the lack of an 
effective dispute settlement mechanism could hamper the effective implementation of 
activities funded through global financing. The implementation of agreed measures should 
also be closely scrutinized, particularly if large financial flows are involved. This needs to be 
backed by conflict resolutions mechanisms. Effectively addressing the Southeast Asian haze 
problem may therefore need a rethink of ASEAN regional cooperation, alongside more 
effective regional and global mechanisms for planning and financing environmental 
strategies. We also recognize that the provision of financial incentives is not sufficient in itself 
to solve the haze problem. Limited reform of the legislation regulating fire use is required 
(e.g. Tan 2005). However, the regulatory reform needed is certainly simpler than reforming 
the whole forestry sector (Barber and Schweithelm 2000; Mayer 2006). It is possible that to   21
implement sustainable forest management in Indonesia such a reform is needed. 
However, that is an issue that although important does not exactly overlap with the haze 
problem. 
Similar lessons can be drawn for the broader issue of international co-operation on 
transboundary environmental problems in developing countries. To ensure the greatest 
chance of success, strategies for mitigation need to be focused on the core issues. In 
designing mechanisms for dealing with environmental challenges, local pressures for 
development and requirements for livelihoods the root causes of environmental problems 
need to be clearly identified. Finally, any transboundary benefits of mitigation should be 
translated into effective local incentives, which may require innovative international 
mechanisms for financing sustainable development. 
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1 We refer to this publication as an information paper because it does not contain detailed data to 
support the statements it makes. It reports that the oxidation of degraded peatland results in average 
annual emissions in Southeast Asia of about 600 million tones of CO2. Carbon emissions are 
exacerbated by fires and in 1997, 1998, and 2002 they may have been between 3,000 and 9,400 
million tones. The highest figure is 21 times and 11 times the level of emissions reported by Tacconi 
(2003) and Page et al. (2002) respectively. 
2 Member countries include Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myammar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. Seven countries had ratified the Agreement as of July 
2005.    22
 
3 The two Plans can be viewed at www.aseansec.org. 
4 See ASEAN ‘Haze Watch’, various issues, www.haze-online.or.id. 
5 See www.worldbank.org/eapfleg. 
6 See ‘Asean sets up anti-haze fund’, 12 November 2006, ASEAN Haze-online, www.haze-
online.or.id. 
7 The thirteen environmental agreements are: Convention on long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping Waste and Other Matters, 1978 
Protocol to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species, Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea 
Against Pollution, Convention on the Conservation of Antartic Marine Living Resources, International 
Tropical Timber Trade Agreement, Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal, Framework Convention on Climate Change, Convention on Biological Diversity, Kyoto 
Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, and Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity. 
The ranking is for when the existence of Protocols is excluded (the Agreement being too recent to 
have Protocols). 
8 Kalimantan is the Indonesian part of the island of Borneo. 
9 This section is based on Tacconi (2003) unless otherwise stated. 
10 In normal years, Riau probably has more land clearing fires (as detected by satellite) than any other 
province in Indonesia. From historical rainfall records, it does not suffer severely from El Niño 
droughts. In Riau, there were many fires and haze pollution from plantation fires on peat lands in early 
1997 and early 1998 but no wildfires such as in Jambi and South Sumatra during the peak haze 
months of September to mid-November 1997 (I. Anderson, pers. comm. to Luca Tacconi, Nov 2002). 
11 President Suharto ostensibly promoted the project to allow the transmigration of up to one million 
settlers. Environmental impact assessments had shown it was not viable and it has been abandoned. 
It is the largest area of degraded peatland in Indonesia and therefore the most significant source of 
haze emissions in the country and one of the most significant, if not the most significant source of 
carbon emissions in Indonesia (Silvius et al. 2006). 
12 Pittock (2005) cautiously notes that data are available only for the Northern Hemisphere. That a 
similar condition applies to the Southern Hemisphere can only be inferred.   23
 
13 It is possible that carbon emissions were much higher, see note 1. 
14 The financial and economic aspects of fires presented here are derived from Tacconi et al. (2006). 
15 However see Chokkalingam et al. (in press; 2005) and Suyanto et al. (2004) for detailed case 
studies in Sumatra. 
16 Quah (2002) has convincingly argued that it is in the interest of neighboring countries such as 
Singapore to provide financial support to Indonesia to prevent and mitigate fires. 
17 Indonesian legislation forbids the development of peat deeper than three meters. Consideration 
needs therefore to be given to the preparation of guidelines for the development of peat up to three 
meters of depth, including guidelines on conditions under which controlled burning may take place. 
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